Strike Force Coburn Report
These are the links to the four Coburn files and below them is a lsit of their contents:
Strikeforce Coburn report part 1.pdf ( 2.2 MB) Pages 1-40
Strikeforce Coburn report part 2.pdf ( 1.6 MB) Pages 41-70
Strikeforce Coburn report part 3.pdf ( 1.1 MB) Pages 71-92
Strikeforce Coburn report part 4.pdf ( 1.9 MB) Pages 93-end
This is the link to all the documents are on the website of Legislative Council Social Issues Inquiry into Issues relating to Redfern Waterloo.
NSW Police
Final Report - Part A
Analysis - Redfern Local Area Command Civil Unrest 15-16 February 2004
Strike Force Coburn
Coburn Review Team
Assistant Commissioner John Laycock APM, Dip Law Detective Inspector Brenton Lee
Detective Inspector Frank Gilroy Detective Inspector Luke Freudenstein Intelligence Analyst Aimee Attard Senior Constable Scott Richardson Senior Sergeant Garry Dunn Inspector Barry Gallagher
Table of Contents
TERMS OF REFERENCE 7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8
Incident Overview: 15 - 16 February 2004 8
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 13
Equipment 13
Communications 14
Awareness & preparation 16
Staffing 17
Comand & control 19
Strategic planning 20
Immediate availability-equipment and personnel 21
Policy 21
Lupton Report review 21
METHODOLOGY 23
GENERAL TIMELINE OF EVENTS 24
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS TIMELINE 27
EXECUTIVE INVOLVEMENT/COMMUNICATIONS TIMELINE 29
OSG, PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT TIMELINE 32
Timeline Definitions 37
EQUIPMENT 38
Physical Assets on hand at Redfern 38
Asset storage and access arrangements 38
Adequacy of equipment under the circumstances 39
One Size Fits All 40
Recognised Standards 41
Equipment Difficulties encountered on the ground 42
Options to improve equipment in the future 42
Less than lethal force - Equipment 43
Command equipment 45
Prison vans & arrest procedures 46
Logistics planning in place for distribution of riot equipment 46
Level of experience of Police at Redfern riot 47
Level of training in the use of riot equipment 47
Supervisor awareness of assets and their availability / location 48
Supervisor awareness of additional reserves of riot equipment / location 48
Supervisor awareness of authorisation requirements for access to riot equipment 48
FINDINGS - EQUIPMENT 48
RECOMMENDATIONS - EQUIPMENT 49
COMMUNICATIONS 50
Notifications relevant to the death of Thomas Hickey 51
Executive communications - unfolding riot 51
Role of the DOI, and any subsequent breakdown in Notifications 56
Adequacy of Police Radio communications at the time of the Civil Disobedience 58
Radio Traffic volume issues on the 15-16 February 2004 58
Communications issues with equipment on the front line during riot 58
On Site Records 59
Role & adequacy of Public Affairs Branch (Media Unit) 59
Operations Support Group Call Out 61 Activation of the Police Operations Centre 62
FINDINGS - COMMUNICATIONS 63
RECOMMENDATIONS - COMMUNICATIONS 64
AWARENESS AND PREPARATION 64
Intelligence Systems and Informant Network 65
The Intelligence System at Redfern LAC 75
The Informant Network at Redfern LAC 76
Signals of impending problems 76
The role of support units 82
Role of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers in the lead up to the riot 83
Performance of Redfern ACLOs and their relationship with Police 83
Understanding and appreciation of impending violence - initial incident 84
Warning signs 86
Cultural awareness 89
FINDINGS - AWARENESS AND PREPARATION 90
RECOMMENDATIONS - AWARENESS AND PREPARATION 90
STAFFING ISSUES 91
Adequacy of Police rostered for duty on evening of 15 February 2004 91
Appropriateness of 1" Response Agreement at Redfern 93
Intelligence based 1st Response Agreement vs Traditional Model 93
Turnover of personnel through Redfern Local Area Command 94
Delay in additional Police resources being called and arriving at the scene 94
Role of Operations Support Command and other scare resources 95
Current status and call out protocols of support units 96
Media Unit 96
Video Unit 96
Mounted Unit 97
Police Air Wing 97
Dog Squad 98
Transport section 98
Special Services Group (SSG ) 99
Police Rescue Squad 99
Welfare Services 99
Negotiators Unit 99
Welfare 100
Rest & Refreshment of Police 101
Injuries 101
Region Responsibilities 101
Region Operations Manager 101
Region Intelligence Co-Ordinator 102
OSG advice to Local Area Commands (OSG Commissioned Officer) 102
LAC Crime Management Units (CMU) 103
Experience levels at Redfern during Riot 104
Redfern LAC 105
OSG Personnel 105
Police Injuries 106
FINDINGS - STAFFING: 106
RECOMMENDATIONS - STAFFING 107
COMMAND & CONTROL 108
Outline of activities relating to the establishment of the Command Post: 110
Commanders Operational Phase III
Command Post 115
Site Co-ordination 116
Operational Logs 116
Follow-up of requests 116
Decision making 116
Command and Control 117
What role did (or should) the Operations Support Group (OSG) play in the events of 15-16 February 2004? : 117
Arrest, charging and evidence gathering considerations 119
Appropriate assessment of incident severity 120
Post Riot SOPs 122
Skills of Commanders 122
Training 123
FINDINGS - COMMAND AND CONTROL 123
RECOMMENDATIONS - COMMAND AND CONTROL 124
SUBMISSIONS 125
Police Association Concerns 125
LIST OF SUBMISSIONS 126
List of Omissions