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Strike Force Coburn Report

The Strike Force Coburn Report documents are not searchable documents. To make it easier for people to find areas of interest we have reproduced the Table of Contents from the report. These documents are on the website of Legislative Council Social Issues Inquiry into Issues relating to Redfern Waterloo. The Coburn report is broken up into four files. We have identified the pages of the report covered by each of the files, indicated their size and provided the direct links to these files below.

These are the links to the four Coburn files and below them is a lsit of their contents:

 

Strikeforce Coburn report part 1.pdf  ( 2.2 MB) Pages 1-40

 

Strikeforce Coburn report part 2.pdf  ( 1.6 MB) Pages 41-70

 

Strikeforce Coburn report part 3.pdf  ( 1.1 MB) Pages 71-92

 

Strikeforce Coburn report part 4.pdf  ( 1.9 MB) Pages 93-end

 

This is the link to all the documents are on the website of Legislative Council Social Issues Inquiry into Issues relating to Redfern Waterloo.

 

NSW Police

Final Report - Part A

Analysis - Redfern Local Area Command Civil Unrest 15-16 February 2004

Strike Force Coburn

 

Coburn Review Team

Assistant Commissioner John Laycock APM, Dip  Law Detective Inspector Brenton Lee

Detective Inspector Frank Gilroy Detective Inspector Luke Freudenstein Intelligence Analyst Aimee Attard Senior Constable Scott Richardson Senior Sergeant Garry Dunn Inspector Barry Gallagher

 

Table of Contents

TERMS OF REFERENCE  7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8

Incident Overview: 15 - 16 February 2004 8

 

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 13

Equipment 13

Communications  14

Awareness & preparation 16

Staffing 17

Comand & control 19

Strategic planning  20

Immediate availability-equipment and personnel   21

Policy  21

Lupton Report review  21

 

METHODOLOGY 23

GENERAL TIMELINE OF EVENTS 24

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS TIMELINE 27

EXECUTIVE INVOLVEMENT/COMMUNICATIONS TIMELINE 29

OSG, PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT TIMELINE 32

Timeline Definitions 37

 

EQUIPMENT 38

Physical Assets on hand at Redfern 38

Asset storage and access arrangements  38

Adequacy of equipment under the circumstances 39

One Size Fits All 40

Recognised Standards 41

Equipment Difficulties encountered on the ground   42

Options to improve equipment in the future 42

Less than lethal force - Equipment  43

Command equipment 45

Prison vans & arrest procedures  46

Logistics planning in place for distribution of riot equipment   46

Level of experience of Police at Redfern riot   47

Level of training in the use of riot equipment 47

Supervisor awareness of assets and their availability / location   48

Supervisor awareness of additional reserves of riot equipment / location   48

Supervisor awareness of authorisation requirements for access to riot equipment  48

FINDINGS - EQUIPMENT 48

RECOMMENDATIONS - EQUIPMENT 49

 

COMMUNICATIONS 50

Notifications relevant to the death of Thomas Hickey 51

Executive communications - unfolding riot 51

Role of the DOI, and any subsequent breakdown in Notifications 56

Adequacy of Police Radio communications at the time of the Civil Disobedience  58

Radio Traffic volume issues on the 15-16 February 2004 58

Communications issues with equipment on the front line during riot   58

On Site Records 59

Role & adequacy of Public Affairs Branch (Media Unit) 59

Operations Support Group Call Out  61 Activation of the Police Operations Centre   62

FINDINGS - COMMUNICATIONS 63

RECOMMENDATIONS - COMMUNICATIONS 64

 

AWARENESS AND PREPARATION  64

Intelligence Systems and Informant Network 65

The Intelligence System at Redfern LAC 75

The Informant Network at Redfern LAC  76

Signals of impending problems  76

The role of support units 82

Role of Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers in the lead up to the riot   83

Performance of Redfern ACLOs and their relationship with Police  83

Understanding and appreciation of impending violence - initial incident  84

Warning signs 86

Cultural awareness 89

FINDINGS - AWARENESS AND PREPARATION  90

RECOMMENDATIONS - AWARENESS AND PREPARATION  90

 

STAFFING ISSUES 91

Adequacy of Police rostered for duty on evening of 15 February 2004 91

Appropriateness of 1" Response Agreement at Redfern  93

Intelligence based 1st Response Agreement vs Traditional Model   93

Turnover of personnel through Redfern Local Area Command   94

Delay in additional Police resources being called and arriving at the scene  94

Role of Operations Support Command and other scare resources   95

Current status and call out protocols of support units 96

Media Unit 96

Video Unit  96

Mounted Unit  97

Police Air Wing 97

Dog Squad  98

Transport section  98

Special Services Group (SSG ) 99

Police Rescue Squad 99

Welfare Services 99

Negotiators Unit 99

Welfare  100

Rest & Refreshment of Police  101

Injuries 101

Region Responsibilities  101

Region Operations Manager 101

Region Intelligence Co-Ordinator  102

OSG advice to Local Area Commands (OSG Commissioned Officer)   102

LAC Crime Management Units (CMU)  103

Experience levels at Redfern during Riot 104

Redfern LAC  105

OSG Personnel 105

Police Injuries 106

FINDINGS - STAFFING:  106

RECOMMENDATIONS - STAFFING 107

 

COMMAND & CONTROL 108

Outline of activities relating to the establishment of the Command Post:   110

Commanders Operational Phase  III

Command Post 115

Site Co-ordination 116

Operational Logs  116

Follow-up of requests  116

Decision making 116

Command and Control 117

What role did (or should) the Operations Support Group (OSG) play in the events of 15-16 February 2004? : 117

Arrest, charging and evidence gathering considerations  119

Appropriate assessment of incident severity 120

Post Riot SOPs 122

Skills of Commanders 122

Training 123

FINDINGS - COMMAND AND CONTROL  123

RECOMMENDATIONS - COMMAND AND CONTROL   124

 

SUBMISSIONS 125

Police Association Concerns  125

LIST OF SUBMISSIONS  126

 

List of Omissions